Forensic Science · Topic 6 of 9
Dark Web, MySQL and Cloud Forensics
Learn the dark web and TOR relays and bridges, the MySQL data directory, cloud service and deployment models, cloud threats, AWS and Google Cloud.
- 5 min
- TOR uses three relays: entry (guard), middle and exit; bridges are unlisted entry nodes.
- Onion services use .onion addresses and hide the server location.
- MySQL evidence sits in the data directory and in binary, general, slow and error logs.
What it is
This page covers three environments where evidence is found in unusual places: the dark web, a MySQL database server and the cloud. Each has its own architecture, its own evidence sources and its own legal and practical limits.
How it works
The dark web
The internet is often described in three layers. The surface web is indexed by search engines. The deep web is content not indexed, such as banking portals, email and databases behind a login. The dark web is a part of the deep web reachable only with special software such as TOR, using onion addresses. It is used for privacy and also for illegal markets, so investigators meet it in cases of drugs, stolen data, fraud and malware trade.
TOR relays and bridge nodes
TOR (The Onion Router) sends traffic through a chain of volunteer relays, each knowing only its neighbors.
| Node | Role |
|---|---|
| Entry (guard) relay | First hop, sees the user's address but not the destination |
| Middle relay | Passes traffic on, sees neither end |
| Exit relay | Last hop, sends traffic to the destination, which sees the exit address |
| Bridge | An unlisted entry relay, used where TOR relays are blocked |
Bridges are not published in the main relay list, so a network cannot easily block them.
How the TOR Browser works
The TOR Browser builds a circuit of three relays. The client wraps the data in layers of encryption, one for each relay. Each relay removes only its own layer and forwards the rest, so no single relay knows both the source and the destination. Onion services (addresses ending in .onion) are reached through rendezvous points, so the server's location is also hidden. The browser is configured to resist tracking and keeps little history.
Risks of investigating the dark web
- Exposure of the investigator's identity if safeguards fail.
- Malware, exploits and tracking in hostile sites.
- Illegal content that may be unlawful to access or store without authority.
- Legal limits, since undercover work and entrapment rules differ by country.
Precautions: use an isolated, dedicated machine, authorized accounts, no personal identity, full documentation and legal guidance.
Internal architecture of MySQL
MySQL is a relational database server with layers:
- Connection layer: handles client connections, authentication and threads.
- SQL layer: parses and optimizes queries, with caches and the permissions system.
- Storage engine layer: stores and retrieves data. Common engines are InnoDB (the default, transactional) and MyISAM (older, non transactional).
- File system: the data files and logs on disk.
Structure of the data directory
The data directory (commonly /var/lib/mysql on Linux) holds the evidence.
| Item | What it holds |
|---|---|
| One folder per database | Files for the tables in that database |
| .frm | Table definition files in older versions; MySQL 8.0 stores them in a data dictionary instead |
| .MYD and .MYI | MyISAM data and index files |
| .ibd | InnoDB table files when file per table is on |
| ibdata1 | InnoDB shared system tablespace |
| Binary logs | Record of data changing statements, useful for timeline and recovery |
| General query log | Every statement received, when enabled |
| Error log | Server start up, shutdown and error messages |
Types of cloud computing services
| Model | What the provider manages | Example evidence difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| IaaS | Hardware and virtualization, customer manages OS and above | Customer can image virtual disks and take snapshots |
| PaaS | Also the runtime and platform | Evidence limited to application and platform logs |
| SaaS | The whole application | Evidence mostly through provider logs and exports |
Cloud deployment models
Public clouds are shared and run by a provider. Private clouds serve one organization. Community clouds are shared by organizations with common needs. Hybrid clouds combine two or more models. The more control the customer has over the platform, the more evidence it can collect itself.
Cloud computing threats and attacks
| Threat | Description |
|---|---|
| Misconfiguration | Open storage or permissive access rules |
| Account hijacking | Stolen credentials or keys |
| Insecure APIs | Weak authentication on management interfaces |
| Data breach and loss | Exposed or deleted data |
| Denial of service | Resource exhaustion |
Cloud forensics is hard because data is spread across regions, the customer shares control with the provider, and logs may be kept only for a limited time.
AWS and Google Cloud fundamentals
| Purpose | AWS | Google Cloud |
|---|---|---|
| Virtual machines | EC2 | Compute Engine |
| Object storage | S3 | Cloud Storage |
| Disk copies | EBS snapshots | Persistent disk snapshots |
| Account activity log | CloudTrail | Cloud Audit Logs |
| Network traffic records | VPC Flow Logs | VPC Flow Logs |
| Identity and access | IAM | Cloud IAM |
A snapshot of a virtual disk is the cloud equivalent of a disk image, and the audit log shows who did what through the control interfaces.
A worked example
A storage bucket holding customer data was read from an unknown address. The investigator exports the audit log for the bucket, preserves it with a hash, snapshots the virtual machine that used the bucket's credentials, and requests the provider's retention records if legal authority exists.
How the exam asks about this
- "Which TOR node is an unlisted entry point used in censored networks?" → A bridge.
- "Which MySQL file type stores InnoDB shared tablespace data?" → ibdata1.
- "Which cloud model gives the customer the most control over the operating system?" → IaaS.
What to remember for the exam
- TOR uses three relays: entry (guard), middle and exit; bridges are unlisted entry nodes.
- Onion services use .onion addresses and hide the server location.
- MySQL evidence sits in the data directory and in binary, general, slow and error logs.
- IaaS gives the most customer control, SaaS the least.
- Cloud evidence relies on audit logs, snapshots and provider cooperation.
Investigate the dark web only from an isolated, authorized system with a legal basis. Accessing illegal material without authority can itself be a crime.
Common mistakes
Assuming the exit relay is the user's origin. The exit address is the relay, not the person.
Ignoring MySQL binary logs. They give a sequence of changes that tables alone cannot.
Expecting full system access in SaaS. The customer usually depends on the provider for logs and exports.
Check yourself
Which TOR relay does the destination server see?
The exit relay.
Where does MySQL keep InnoDB tables when file per table is enabled?
In .ibd files in the database folder of the data directory.
Which AWS service records API activity for an account?
CloudTrail.
Topic 6 of 9 in Forensic Science
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